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COMMENT
ABANDONMENT IN THE FACE OF
POSSIBLE Toxic CONTAMINATION:
WHAT'S A LENDER To Do?
by Paula Thornton Perkins
I. INTRODUCTION
HE modem lender faces an increasingly sticky situation when a
bankruptcy trustee attempts to abandon potentially contaminated
real estate.' A trustee's abandonment of an estate property is gener-
ally irrevocable, 2 and the lender could be stuck with the cleanup bill.3 Un-
fortunately, inconsistent policies underlie state and federal environmental
laws and relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions.4
An increasing number of bankruptcy filings, 5 however, will involve the
1. A bankruptcy trustee can abandon property under 11 U.S.C. § 55 4(a) (1988). The
trustee's power to abandon generally applies to any estate property that is "burdensome" or of
"inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." Id. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor Bank-
ruptcy Rule 6007 places a time limitation on the trustee. Under the precode rule, however, the
trustee had to abandon within a reasonable time. See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92
F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763, 303 U.S. 636 (1938) (trustee has reason-
able amount of time in which to decide whether he will accept unprofitable estate property);
Hill v. Larcon Co., 131 F. Supp. 469, 474 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (trustee who failed to accept
property within 60 days did not acquire title to it); In re Malcom, 48 F. Supp. 675, 679 (E.D.
Ill. 1943) (trustee allowed reasonable time to reject burdensome property); 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 554.021] (L. King 15th ed. 1990) [hereinafter COLLIER].
2. In re Brio Refining, Inc., 86 Bankr. 487, 490 (N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Polumbo, 271 F.
Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Va. 1967).
3. See Brio Refining, 86 Bankr. at 488-89 (court refused to give pre-cleanup expenses
arising after trustee abandoned property administrative priority because abandoned property
"was not part of the debtor's estate at the time that the [creditors] expended the monies that
they seek as an administrative expense"); Corash & Behrendt, Lender Liability Under CER-
CLA: Search for a Safe Harbor, 43 Sw. L.J. 863, 864 (1990) (lender may be liable for debtor's
cleanup costs in certain circumstances).
4. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HAZARDOUS WASTE MAN-
AGEMENT: A SURVEY OF STATE LEGISLATION (1982) for general information on state envi-
ronmental laws; see also 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988) ("[T]he trustee may abandon any property
of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate.") (emphasis supplied); Comment, Abandonment of Toxic Wastes Under Section 554
of the Bankruptcy Code, 71 MARQ. L. REV., 353, 357 (1988) (state environmental laws usually
conflict with Bankruptcy Code).
5. As of August 1985, an estimated 74 toxic waste handlers had filed for bankruptcy.
Cosetti and Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs, and Penn Terra: The Bankruptcy
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problem of abandonment of contaminated real property. 6 Thus, the astute
lender will search for ways to avoid financing insolvent debtors' toxic
cleanup costs.7 This Comment briefly examines the history of abandonment
and environmental laws.8 The discussion then turns to recent case law inter-
preting the impact of environmental laws on bankruptcy law.9 Finally, this
Comment discusses possible solutions to the lender's dilemma.' 0
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
A. Abandonment
1. Abandonment at Common Law
Congress passed the first major bankruptcy legislation in the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 (1898 Act).1 ' Although the 1898 Act provided for abandon-
ment of certain types of property, 12 the liquidation trustee did not possess a
general power of abandonment. 13 This lack of power stood virtually un-
changed until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.14 Thus, current statu-
tory abandonment has its roots in the common law. 15
Under the common law rule, the bankruptcy trustee could request permis-
sion from the court to abandon any asset that burdened the estate 16 and
hindered the liquidation process.17 This rule served the primary purpose of
Code and State Environmental Laws-Perceived Conflicts and Options for the Trustee and State
Environmental Agencies, 7 J. L. & COMM. 65, 68 (1987) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE, ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARDS JEOPARDIZED WHEN FACILI-
TIES CEASE OPERATING 18 (1986)). See also E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS:
A COMPLETE GUIDE To PREDICTING, AVOIDING, AND DEALING WITH BANKRUPTCY 1
(1983) (from 1979 to 1980, bankruptcies increased 55%).
6. According to an EPA study, during the next 50 years 25-30% of entities owning land
disposal facilities will file for bankruptcy. Cosetti and Friedman, supra note 5, at 68. See also
R. MORRISON, BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES FROM CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES 24-26 (1985)
(explaining why the number of bankruptcies will remain high for years to come).
7. See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 11-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 126-310 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 315-66 and accompanying text.
11. Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970) (repealed 1978 and recodified as I U.S.C. § 505(b)
(1988)); 11 U.S.C. § 1 10(a)(2) (1970) (repealed 1978); 11 U.S.C. § l10(b) (providing for relief
from burdensome taxes, patents and trademarks, and leases) (repealed 1978 and recodified as
11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988)).
13. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, at 554.01.
14. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-9032 and in
various sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988). Today, bankruptcy trustees derive their abandonment
power from 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). See supra note 1.
15. See First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S.
513, 515 (1896); American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884); Gochenour Cleveland
Terminals Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 89, 94 (6th Cir. 1941); Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d
1004, 1007 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v.
Logan, 92 F.2d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763, 303 U.S. 636 (1938); Central
States Life Ins. Co. v. Koplar Co., 80 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
687 (1936); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933); Quinn v.
Gardner, 32 F.2d 772, 773 (8th Cir. 1929).
16. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1952).
17. Id. at 290.
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bankruptcy litigation-to convert the debtor's estate to cash as quickly as
possible for distribution to the creditors."' Under the 1898 Act the trustee
actually took title to the estate property.' 9 Abandonment divested this title
from the trustee and revested it in the debtor.20
2. Common Law Restrictions on Abandonment Under the 1898 Act
Although courts under the 1898 Act generally allowed a trustee to aban-
don a debtor's property,2 ' most placed some restrictions on the scope of the
trustee's power. 22 In the 1942 reorganization proceeding of In re Chicago
Rapid Transit Co. 23 the trustees for the debtor, a public transportation util-
ity, sought to abandon a leased railroad line. The line operated at a deficit
and the debtor had fallen far behind in rental payments. The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that the trustees could not abandon the line
without permission from the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC).24 The
court further held that Congress had not given bankruptcy courts jurisdic-
tion to determine whether a public service should cease operations or con-
tinue out of public necessity. 25 Instead, such authority lay with the ICC,
and Congress left the district court powerless to disturb ICC authority.26
In requiring compliance with Illinois state law, the court created an excep-
tion to the trustees' abandonment power. 27 The court did, however, author-
ize the trustees to reject the lease because it was a personal contract and
would not affect the state's authority to regulate its utilities.28 Thus, the
trustees still had the expense of operating the rail line property, but they no
longer had to pay rent. This ruling accomplished the dual purposes of re-
quiring compliance with state law while protecting the estate from undue
burdens.
Importantly, Chicago Rapid Transit involved a reorganization, not a liqui-
dation. A reorganization trustee must operate the estate in accordance with
state law.29 Courts often refuse to impose this duty on a liquidation trustee,
18. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966); 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, at 554.01.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970) (repealed 1978); 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, at 1 554.02[2].
20. 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, at § 554.02[2].
21. See First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S.
513, 515 (1896); Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1952); Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933).
22. See, e.g., Ottenheimer, 198 F.2d at 290 (trustee could not abandon worthless barges);
Chicago Junction R.R. Co. v. Sprague (In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942) (trustee could not abandon railroad line which
was public necessity); In re Lewis Jones, Inc. [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 65,471 (D.Pa. Nov. 7, 1974) (court required sealing of underground lines prior to
abandonment).
23. 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942). This case involved a
reorganization under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 207 (1940), recodified
as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).






29. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988).
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however, since the trustee only liquidates, and does not operate, the estate. 30
Moreover, the Chicago Rapid Transit court emphasized the priority federal
law takes over state law.3 1 The case preceded codification of abandonment
power, however, when no legislated federal abandonment rule existed to su-
persede state law.
Ten years later, in Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,32 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals also placed a limitation on abandonment. The Fourth Circuit held
that a federal statute designed to ensure navigation safety preempted the
judicially created abandonment rule.33 In Ottenheimer a bankruptcy trustee
attempted to abandon worthless barges by sinking them in the Baltimore
harbor. City and United States officials objected because, if abandoned, the
barges would obstruct navigable waters. An obstruction of this type violated
a federal statute that carried a fine, imprisonment, or both.34 If the trustee
abandoned the property, ownership would revest in the debtor. The debtor,
in turn, would face the penalties imposed by the statute. 35 Accordingly, the
court denied the abandonment request and required the trustee to remove
the barges, at considerable expense to the estate. 36 In so doing, the court
stated that its primary reason for refusing to allow abandonment was to
avoid injustice to the debtor. 37
In a more recent case under the 1898 Act, In re Lewis Jones, Inc.,38 the
court directed the trustee to petition for authority to fill and seal under-
ground steam lines before abandoning them.39 The estate possessed the abil-
ity to fund these precautionary measures, which would eliminate any
potential for future harm to the public. Significantly, Lewis Jones was actu-
30. See In re Microfab, Inc., 105 Bankr. 161, 169 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (a chapter 7
"trustee cannot be ordered to comply with a cleanup obligation that he does not have the
financial resources to satisfy"); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1986) (Supreme Court did not intend § 959(b) to apply directly to § 554 abandonment);
In re Commercial Oil Serv., Inc., 58 Bankr. 311, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd, 88
Bankr. 126 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (court dismissed bankruptcy to relieve trustee of duty to bring
polluted property into compliance with state law); In re Charles George Land Reclamation
Trust, 30 Bankr. 918, 923 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (court dismissed bankruptcy rather than
require trustee to clean up contaminated property); In re Adelphi Hosp. Corp., 579 F.2d 726,
729 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (liquidation trustee "is in no sense a manager of an institu-
tion's operations .... "). See also 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (outlining liquidation truste's du-
ties); Pueblo Sav. & Trust Co. v. Power (In re Power), 115 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1940); Bunch
v. Maloney, 233 F. 967, 969 (8th Cir. 1916), rev'd on other grounds, 246 U.S. 658 (1918); Trice
v. Coolidge Banking Co., 242 F. 175, 176 (S.D. Ga. 1917); Gardner v. Rich Mfg. Co., 68 Cal.
App. 2d 725, 731, 158 P.2d 23, 29 (1945). These cases all support the proposition that a
liquidating trustee's main duty is to reduce estate assets to cash for distribution to creditors.
31. 129 F.2d at 4. "[Bankruptcy law], when given expression in legislation by Congress, is
paramount and transcends and supersedes all inconsistent state laws." Id.
32. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
33. Id. at 290.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). See also id. § 409 (permitting or causing vessels to sink in
navigable waters in such a way that obstructs or endangers navigation is illegal).
35. 198 F.2d at 290.
36. Id.
37. Id.





ally an advisory opinion rather than a ruling. Thus, while the court may
have indicated that a trustee cannot abandon property without first provid-
ing for the public safety, the opinion does not carry the weight of a court
decision.4° Furthermore, the court failed to specifically address whether the
trustee's abandonment power is subject to state laws intended to protect the
public welfare.41
3. Abandonment in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Congress legislatively recognized the trustee's abandonment power in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the Code).42 Section 554 of the Code43
allows a trustee to abandon property that is "burdensome" or of "inconse-
quential value" to the estate." This provision facilitates distribution of es-
tate assets to general creditors as quickly as possible.45 Distribution to
creditors is made in an orderly fashion, 46 and debt priority determines who
is satisfied first.47 Abandonment under section 554 divests the estate of con-
trol48 of the property and usually returns it to the debtor,49 along with all
prepetition rights and obligations.50 The debtor is then treated as having
40. See Note, Abandonment Rights Under Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code: Midlan-
tic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 40 Sw. LJ. 1103,
1108 (1986).
41. Id.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988).
43. Throughout this Comment the terms "1978 Act," "Bankruptcy Code," and the
"Code" are used interchangeably.
44. Section 554(a) provides: "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the
estate."
45. See Note, supra note 40, at 1106 (bankruptcy liquidation's primary purpose is to expe-
ditiously reduce estate property to money for distribution to general creditors). See also 4
COLLIER, supra note 1, at 554.01 (primary purpose of liquidation is to convert debtor's estate
to cash as quickly as possible for distribution to general creditors). But see Terrell, Caveat
Lender: The Midlantic Decision and its Progeny, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 60 (1989)
("Before the 1978 revisions to the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee's abandonment power had
been limited by a judicially developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state or federal
interests.") (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494,
500 (1986)).
46. 1 U.S.C. § 507 (1988) sets forth administrative and unsecured claim priorities.
47. Id. State law determines secured creditor priority. See Note, Tort Creditor Priority in
the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1046-
49 (1984).
48. Prior to 1978 the trustee took legal title to the estate property. Under 11 U.S.C. § 541
(1988) the trustee no longer takes title to the property, but only controls it. See 4 COLLIER,
supra note 1, at 554.02[2].
49. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n.12 (1984). Abandoned property reverts to
the person with a possessory interest in it. Id. This is usually the debtor. See Drabkin, Moor-
man & Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: Caveat Creditor, 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,168, 10,172 (1985).
50. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 29 Bankr. 787, 793 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd, 729
F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Commercial Credit Plan, 13 Bankr. 643, 645 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1981); In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581, 590 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). Cf supra
notes 19, 20 and accompanying text (prior to 1978 both ownership and control vested in, and




On its face, section 554 gives the trustee almost unlimited abandonment
power, subject only to the requirements set forth in the section itself.52 Ex-
actly how much Congress intended to restrict the trustee's abandonment
power is the subject of ongoing debate in the courts.53 The controversy
hinges largely on what the courts interpret as Congress' intent behind statu-
tory enactment of the abandonment rule in 1978.54
Since the liquidating debtor rarely has any appreciable assets, abandon-
ment of contaminated property effectively serves to separate it from its only
source of cleanup funds: the estate.55 Thus, if an environmental agency de-
contaminates the property, the government, and thereby the taxpayer, usu-
ally must foot the bill.5 6 For this reason, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and similar state environmental authorities ordinarily oppose
abandonment of toxic waste facilities. 57 By the same token, if a court bars
the trustee from abandoning the property, the estate, and thereby at least
some of the creditors, bear the cleanup burden.
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Midlantic National Bank v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection," abandonment of burden-
some hazardous waste sites was the general rule. 59 A trustee would attempt
51. See Mason v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir. 1980); 4 COLLIER, supra
note 1, at 554.01.
52. The requirements include burdensomeness and/or inconsequential value or benefit to
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
53. Interestingly, abandonment power is crucial only in certain instances - those in
which disposal of property alienates liability. Trustees in charge of hazardous waste properties
usually can abandon only in liquidations because 28 U.S.C. § 959 (1988) precludes it in reorga-
nizations if so doing would amount to illegal waste disposal. See Note, Cleaning Up in Bank-
ruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 870, 880-81 & nn. 81-83 (1985); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation 99
HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1592 (1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
54. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986) (in codifying abandonment, Congress probably intended to include common law limita-
tions on this power). But see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 513 ("[Con-
gress] knew how to draft a qualified abandonment provision" when it wished to.) See also 11
U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1988) (railroad company can abandon lines only when such action is
"consistent with the public interest").
55. Drabkin, Moorman & Kirsch, supra note 49, at 10,172, 10,180.
56. Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1592. Lenders are also held liable for
cleanup costs in certain instances. See infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
57. Drabkin, Moorman & Kirsch, supra note 49, at 10,180.
58. 474 U.S. 494 (1986). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 126-
59 and accompanying text.
59. In re 82 Milbar Blvd. Inc., 91 Bankr. 213, 218 n.16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988). See In re
Stevens, 53 Bankr. 783, 787 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985), rev'd, 68 Bankr. 774 (D. Me. 1987) (haz-
ardous waste is not an exception to § 554 abandonment); Lancaster v. Tennessee (In re Wall
Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1987) (bankruptcy court had previously
allowed trustee to convey property and responsibility for toxic waste cleanup to third parties
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 6007); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 50 Bankr. 790, 794 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1985) (Congress did not create hazardous waste exception to trustee's abandonment
powers); In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 Bankr. 144, 147 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (trustee
allowed to abandon worthless mobile home park); In re Borne Chemical Co., 54 Bankr. 126,
134-35 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (debtor allowed to abandon burdensome property in which it had
no equity). But see City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources
Corp.), 739 F.2d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
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to abandon contaminated property under section 554 if the projected
cleanup expense exceeded the value of the untainted asset.6° The Midlantic
Court, however, in a five-to-four decision, ruled that a trustee cannot aban-
don a hazardous waste facility "in contravention of a state statute or regula-
tion that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from
identified hazards."' 61 The Midlantic opinion created an entirely new set of
problems as courts scrambled to apply the holding to the facts of their
cases.
62
B. The Environmental Statutes
Before reaching the post-Midlantic decisions, a brief survey of federal en-
vironmental statutes is in order.63 These statutes were enacted in response
to growing concern over the impact of toxic waste on the environment, 64 and




Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) to regulate toxic waste generated in the future.66 RCRA enables
authorities to track hazardous substances throughout their entire production
cycle. 67 To achieve this end, RCRA requires the EPA to keep a list of toxic
wastes68 and promulgate standards for the maintenance of storage sites. 69
Violators of RCRA incur both civil and criminal liability.70 A number of
states have also passed hazardous waste legislation similar to RCRA. 7 1
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (public policy favoring environmental cleanup out-
weighs trustee's abandonment power); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. National Smelting
of N.J., Inc. (In re National Smelting of N.J., Inc.) 49 Bankr. 1012, 1015 (D. Colo. 1985)
(citing In re Quanta in reversing the bankruptcy court's abandonment authorization). The
National Smelting court also based its decision on the fact that the trustee did not show that
the requirements of § 554 had been met. "The trustee apparently assumes that the cost would
be astronomical, but no evidence has been presented on this issue." Id. at 1015.
60. In re 82 Milbar Blvd., 91 Bankr. at 218.
61. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
62. See infra notes 161-310 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
64. See infra note 86.
65. See infra notes 71, 80 and accompanying text.
66. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988)).
67. Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1471.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1988).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1988).
70. Under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988), a violator under the RCRA who fails to comply
with a cleanup order within the amount of time prescribed by federal authorities can be or-
dered to pay up to $25,000 per day in penalties for each day of noncompliance.
71. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-30-1 to -30-24 (Michie 1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-
2801 to 36-2827 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4401 to -4432 (Michie 1985 &
Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE §§ 455B.411 to .455 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3430 to -
3472 (1985). For relevant Texas legislation, see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.




Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) in response to the problem of
what to do with previously generated waste.72 CERCLA developed a sys-
tem for discovering and remediating toxic waste properties. 73 CERCLA
also provided for a "Superfund" to finance toxic waste cleanup.74 This fund
finances all CERCLA authorized remedial actions, except those at sites
which have been closed due to CERCLA regulations. 75
Under CERCLA, the EPA can require property owners to do their own
cleanup. 76 Alternatively, the EPA can pay for cleanup out of the Superfund
and sue the property owners for reimbursement. 77 CERCLA imposes steep
penalties for noncompliance. 78 CERCLA does not provide for strict liabil-
ity; however, more than one court has imposed such liability on the responsi-
ble parties. 79 As with RCRA, several states have adopted hazardous waste
statutes resembling CERCLA. 80
Both RCRA and CERCLA require state cooperation, particularly
RCRA.81 RCRA authorizes states to enforce it82 and empowers the EPA to
earmark federal funds83 for use in state programs. 84 CERCLA does not pro-
vide for state regulation but may require states to pay for cleanup in some
situations.8 5 The legislative histories of both RCRA and CERCLA show
that Congress intended to minimize toxic waste costs to society and to assess
them against the parties responsible for them rather than leaving the expense
72. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988)).
73. Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1472.
74. At its origin "Superfund" was actually the Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). Section 9631 was repealed in 1986 by Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1774 and is now part of the Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2796, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682 (1988). For excellent discussions of federal
toxic waste statutes, see Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1470-76; Note, The Inap-
plicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste
Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 594-98 (1983).
75. See Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1472.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) (President can finance cleanup operations through
Superfund); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(b), 961 l(a) (1988) (President is authorized to take action neces-
sary to recover cleanup costs).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988) (allows damages up to three times cleanup costs). See
Murphy, The Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lend-
ing and Investment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1137 (1986).
79. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 58 U.S.L.W. 2713 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1991) (No. 90-504) (hazardous waste site owner or
operator strictly liable for CERCLA response costs); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985).
80. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-101 to -201 (West 1990 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4417 to -4417B (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.381 to .399,
455B.423 to .432 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3431 (1985). For relevant Texas legis-
lation, see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.181 to .203 (Vernon 1990).
81. See Comment, supra note 4, at 356.
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6904(a), 6942(b) (1988).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6931(a) (1988).
85. See Comment, supra note 4, at 357.
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for the general public to bear.86
Courts have often remarked that the section 554 abandonment provision
and federal and state environmental laws cross purposes.8 7 Some courts and
commentators, however, assert that, under CERCLA, a bankruptcy estate
may still be liable for cleanup costs, even after sale or abandonment.88 Lia-
bility continues because CERCLA holds the "owner or operator" of a haz-
ardous waste facility responsible for cleanup.89 When the debtor files for
bankruptcy, the estate becomes the "owner or operator" of the property;
therefore, the estate becomes liable for cleanup under CERCLA. 90 One
commentator has suggested that courts allow trustees to abandon contami-
nated property but continue to hold them responsible for cleanup costs.91
Under this theory the trustee avoids other expenses involved in administer-
ing the subject property, but remains obligated for the cleanup bill.92
3. Lender Liability Under CERCLA
In certain instances the unwary lender may find itself liable under CER-
CLA for hazardous waste cleanup costs. 9 3 CERCLA provides that the
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6123 ("The failure to properly dispose of hazardous waste is costing
the public millions and the cost of cleanup is far more expensive than proper disposal in the
first place .... ). The RCRA's legislative history lacks specific comparisons of improper
waste disposal and regulatory costs, but it is full of congressional concern over the extreme
cost to society of improper waste disposal, both in health and environmental costs. See H.R.
REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6238, 6249 (discussing likelihood of harm to water and food supplies and environment in gen-
eral because of improper waste disposal).
87. Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d 12, 15-
16 (4th Cir. 1988) (toxic waste abandonment question involves both federal state statutes,
which conflict with one another); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 566 (W.D. Okla.
1986) (state environmental laws and Code's abandonment provisions are juxtaposed and can-
not be totally reconciled); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc., 65 Bankr 521, 527 (Bankr. N.D.
W.Va. 1986) (discussing balancing differing policies of abandonment provision and environ-
mental laws); City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.),
739 F.2d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) ("If trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose
of hazardous wastes under the cloak of the abandonment power, compliance with environmen-
tal protection laws will be transformed into governmental cleanup by default.").
88. See In re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co., 56 Bankr. 918, 923 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986) ("The mere transfer of property out of the estate does not also transfer any liability or
potential for liability already attaching to the estate as a result of its connection with the
property") (citing In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 284-85 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985)), rev'd on other grounds, 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987); Drabkin, Moorman & Kirsch,
supra note 49, at 10,181; Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1594.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) provides:
The term "owner or operator" means ... (iii) in the case of any facility, title or
control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or similar means to a unit of state or local government, any per-
son who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility im-
mediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, [sic] who, without
participating in the management of a .. . facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility."
90. See In re T.P. Long Chemical Co., 45 Bankr. 278, 284-85 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
91. See Developments in the Law, supra note 53, at 1594.
92. Id.
93. See infra notes 102-25 and accompanying text.
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lender who "holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect [its] security
interest" in the property is not liable as an owner for CERCLA response
costs. 94 So long as the lender maintains a passive interest in a hazardous
waste site, it need not worry about CERCLA liability. 9 The difficulty arises
when the lender attempts to foreclose on its mortgage after the debtor's de-
fault.96 The lender may inadvertently take control of the property in such a
way that falls outside the "indicia of ownership" exception.97
In United States v. Mirabilea8 the EPA removed toxic waste from a paint
manufacturing plant on which American Bank and Trust Co. (ABT) had a
mortgage. The Agency then sued ABT to recover its costs. Prior to the suit
ABT foreclosed on its mortgage and made the highest bid at the foreclosure
sale. Four months after the sale ABT assigned its bid to the Mirabiles, who
owned the property when the EPA filed suit.
ABT contended that its bid at the foreclosure sale did not serve to vest
legal title in ABT.99 Without deciding that issue, the court found ABT's
actions between the time of the bid and the assignment "plainly undertaken
in an effort to protect its security interest in the property." ° During the
four-month interim period, ABT took measures to protect the property from
vandalism, looked into waste drum disposal and showed the property to pro-
spective buyers. The court held that these actions fell within the indicia of
ownership exception. 101 The court noted, however, that if ABT had partici-
pated in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site, such conduct would
have placed it outside the exception.102
In a factually similar case, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co.,103 the court reached the opposite conclusion. In this case the lender
purchased the contaminated property at its foreclosure sale and held it for
four years.104 During that time the EPA cleaned up the property and then
sought to recover its costs from the lender. 105 When the lender attempted to
escape liability under the indicia of ownership exception, the court held that
the exception protected only current mortgagees, not those who acquired
title to the property at foreclosure sales.106 The court distinguished Mirabile
on grounds that Maryland Bank & Trust benefitted from cleanup because it
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
95. Corash & Behrendt, supra note 3, at 868-69.
96. Id. at 869.
97. See infra notes 102-25 and accompanying text.
98. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).




103. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
104. The fact that the Maryland Bank lender held the property for years, as opposed to
months, is probably irrelevant. In United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,698, 20,698-99 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984) a lender was held liable as an owner under
CERCLA after holding the property for only one hour.
105. The lender's bid at the foreclosure sale was $381,500. The cleanup cost totalled ap-
proximately $551,713.50.
106. 632 F. Supp. at 578-79.
[Vol. 441572
COMMENT
held title to the property throughout the process. 10 7
Significantly, the Maryland Bank court ruled that a lender could be liable
as an owner under CERCLA without ever operating the property.108 In this
light, Mirabile's holding that a lender who does not participate in the day-to-
day operations of a contaminated property is not an owner under CERCLA
may no longer be applicable. 109 For this reason, most banks110 have refused
to take title to contaminated property in order to avoid CERCLA liabil-
ity. "' In other words, the Maryland Bank ruling cautions lenders to think
twice before foreclosing on property that may be subject to CERCLA
cleanup.112 Absent an exception from CERCLA liability,' 11 then, lenders
will have to abandon their security interests in contaminated property. 114
Recently, in United States v. Fleet Factors,15 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the lender who participates in the financial management
of a toxic waste site enough to "indicat[e] a capacity to influence the corpo-
ration's treatment of hazardous wastes" is liable under CERCLA.116 The
lender need not participate in the day-to-day management of the site, 17 or
even in decisions involving hazardous waste. 18 If the lender's involvement
in the affairs of the property sufficiently supports an inference that the lender
could have influenced decisions involving hazardous waste, the lender is lia-
ble under CERCLA. 119
The court found that its interpretation of the indicia of ownership excep-
tion was closer to the intent of Congress in enacting CERCLA than the
Mirabile "day-to-day operations standard."' 120 Agreeing with the Maryland
Bank court, the Eleventh Circuit held that lenders have ample means to
ascertain possible hazardous waste problems prior to making loans. 12 1 The
court also noted that lenders can figure their potential liability for CERCLA
107. Id. at 580. Conversely, ABT, in Mirabile, had no interest in the subject property
during cleanup.
108. 632 F. Supp. at 577.
109. Corash & Behrendt, supra note 3, at 870.
110. Id.
111. See Comment, Fear of Foreclosure: United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,165, 10,165 (1986) (describing this refusal as "fear of
foreclosure").
112. See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 3, at 870. For a more in-depth discussion of the
fear of foreclosure rule, see Comment, supra note 111, at 10,169; Seneker & Townsend, New
Liabilities for Lenders: Hazardous Waste and Toxic Building Materials, LEGAL BULL., July
1987, at 363, 373.
113. For a discussion of the exceptions to owner and operator liability, see Corash & Beh-
rendt, supra note 3, at 874-78.
114. For a much more thorough treatment of lender liability under CERCLA, see Corash
& Behrendt, supra note 3, at 868-74.
115. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
116. Id. at 1557.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1557-58.
119. Id. at 1558.
120. Id. at 1558 n.ll.




response costs into the terms of their loan agreements.122 The court rea-
soned that lenders facing potential CERCLA liability will more closely mon-
itor their debtors.' 23 The court further reasoned that lenders will thus
require compliance with state and federal environmental laws before provid-
ing ongoing financial assistance. 124 These actions by lenders would, in turn,
increase compliance with CERCLA.' 25
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: ABANDONMENT VS.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
A. The Effect of Midlantic on Abandonment
1. The Midlantic Decision
In the landmark case of Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection 126 the Supreme Court restricted the scope
of the trustee's abandonment power pursuant to Code section 5 54(a). 127 The
Court held that a trustee cannot abandon property containing toxic waste
"in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed
to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards."'' 28 In arriving
at this decision, the Court examined case law prior to codification of the
trustee's abandonment power in section 554 and congressional intent behind
the codification.
The Court first noted that abandonment had been judicially restricted in
instances in which allowing abandonment would have jeopardized valid state
or federal interests. 129 This restriction, the Court reasoned, constituted a
well-established limitation on the trustee's abandonment power before the
enactment of section 554.130 The Court also found that if Congress intended
to modify these judge-made restrictions on abandonment, it would have ex-
pressly said so.' 3 ' These two factors together persuaded the Court that
122. Id. at 1558.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1558. See Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders
in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1294 (1987) (applying indicia of owner-
ship exception more narrowly "conforms with CERCLA's implicit function of encouraging
safer hazardous waste procedures" and provides lenders incentive to prevent misuse of hazard-
ous waste sites); Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 183-85 (outlining lenders' alternatives
for reducing their potential for liability under narrower construction of exception).
125. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558-59.
126. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
127. Id. at 507.
128. Id. For the facts underlying this decision, see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
129. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500-501. The court relied on the restrictions set forth in Chi-
cago Junction R.R. Co. v. Sprague (In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co.), 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942); Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir.
1952); and In re Lewis Jones, Inc., [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
65,471 (Bankr. D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1974). For a discussion of these cases and the limitations they
placed on common law abandonment, see supra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
130. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
131. Id. "The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific."
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neither it nor Congress had given a bankruptcy trustee the power to abandon
property "in contravention of state or local laws designed to protect public
health or safety."' 32
The Court reasoned that the limitation on the trustee's abandonment
power was similar to the restriction 133 on the automatic stay,' 34 another
"fundamental debtor protection[].' 35 In addition, the Court noted that 28
U.S.C. section 959(b) requires a trustee to operate estate property in compli-
ance with valid state laws. 136 Although section 959(b) does not apply di-
rectly to a section 554 abandonment, the Court still found it indicative of
Congress' intent to limit the trustee's powers. 137
Finally, the Court found support for its position in light of Congress' re-
cent enactment of both RCRA 138 and CERCLA. 139 These federal attempts
to regulate and dispose of environmental waste provided the final impetus
the Court needed to conclude that Congress intended to restrict abandon-
ment power, if necessary, to protect the public and the environment from
toxic pollution.14° All these factors led the Court to hold that bankruptcy
courts cannot authorize trustees to abandon toxic waste sites in violation of
state laws intended to protect the public health or safety. '4'
Despite its significance, several problems cloud the Midlantic decision. 142
First, it was endorsed by only a bare majority of justices. 143 Second, the
Id. (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Translantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979)).
Thus, "[i]f Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from nonban-
kruptcy law, 'the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from
disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt.'" Id.
(quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
132. Id. at 502. The Court also relied on its prior ruling in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,
285 (1985) (anyone in possession of toxic waste site, including bankruptcy trustee, must com-
ply with state environmental laws).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988) allows governmental agencies to pursue nonmonetary
judgments against the debtor, thus exempting them from the automatic stay. One reason for
this is to protect the public from debtor created environmental danger. See S. REP. No. 989,
infra note 135, at 52; H.R. REP. No. 595, infra note 135, at 343.: "Thus, where a governmen-
tal unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation or fraud, environmental protection, con-
sumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for
violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay." H.R.
REP. No. 595, infra note 135, at 343 (emphasis added).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
135. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 503, quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5840; H.R. REP No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6296.
136. Section 959(b) provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as
such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the
owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
137. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. at 494, 505 (1986).
138. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
140. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505-06.
141. Id. at 507.
142. See infra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
143. The Midlantic opinion was a 5-4 decision.
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Court expressly declined to attach a priority to claims for cleanup ex-
penses. 144 Thus, while it precludes a trustee from abandoning property
without first bringing it into compliance with state environmental laws,
Midlantic gives no guidance concerning the source of the cleanup funds.
Third, the limitations placed on abandonment power are uncertain; 145 the
Court stated that the limitation is too narrow to include instances in which
contamination is merely speculative or where no "imminent and identifi-
able" harm to the public is present. 146 Furthermore, the Midlantic rule does
not apply if environmental laws are unreasonable. 147 Attaching definitions
to "imminent" danger and unreasonable laws, however, is a difficult task.
Justice Rehnquist's stinging dissent pointed to other problems with the
Midlantic holding.' 48 Stressing the need in liquidation proceedings for the
expeditious and equitable distribution of estate assets, the dissent assailed the
Court's decision as a great hindrance to this goal. '49 Justice Rehnquist re-
mained unpersuaded that Congress intended to limit a trustee's abandon-
ment powers. 150 He found the language of section 554 absolute in its terms,
bound only by the restrictions in the section itself.' 5' Nothing in the sec-
tion's legislative history convinced him otherwise. 152
Above all, Justice Rehnquist found "particularly unpersuasive" the major-
ity's argument that Congress merely codified into section 554 "well-recog-
nized restrictions of a trustee's abandonment power" from prior case law. 153
The three cases' 54 the majority relied on were, in his opinion, misinter-
preted. Additionally, those cases did not merit recognition for creating
widely accepted limitations on abandonment. 155 Finally, Justice Rehnquist
agreed with the bankruptcy court' 56 that city and state authorities are emi-
nently more qualified to protect the public from toxic contamination than
either a trustee or a debtor's creditors.' 57 Since section 554 requires the
144. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498 n.2.
145. Id. at 507 n.9.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 507-17.
149. Id. at 508.
150. Id. at 509.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 509-10. Justice Rehnquist described the legislative history as "scant" and found
it lacking in support for the majority's position. For this reason, he argued that it could not be
used to infer congressional intent to limit § 554. "We have previously expressed our unwilling-
ness to read into unqualified statutory language exceptions or limitations based upon legislative
history unless that legislative history demonstrates with extraordinary clarity that this was
indeed the intent of Congress." Id. at 510 (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75
(1984)). Moreover, Congress knew how to create a restriction on abandonment when it
wanted to. 474 U.S. at 513 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1988)) (restricting abandonment of
railroad lines).
153. Id. at 507.
154. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
155. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507-08.
156. The bankruptcy court had originally approved the abandonment. See Petition for
Certiorari at 69a, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494
(1986), citing New York v. O'Neill (In re Quanta Resources), No. 81-05967 (Bankr. D.N.J.
June 22, 1982), (available on Lexis, Genfed, Briefs).
157. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 515 (1986).
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trustee to give notice prior to abandonment, 158 these authorities have ample
time to provide for any necessary precautionary measures.159
2. Decisions Since Midlantic
a. Abandonment Allowed
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Midlantic, an increasing number
of courts are ruling in favor of abandonment, even where toxic waste is con-
cededly present on the property. 160 Central to these decisions is the trustee's
ability to fund cleanup and the possibility of harm to the public. If the estate
lacks unencumbered assets and the risk of public harm is relatively low,
courts will often approve abandonment.
In re Oklahoma Refining Co. 161 was one of the first cases to construe
Midlantic. The Oklahoma Refining court determined that Midlantic only
required a bankruptcy court to consider state environmental laws when de-
ciding whether to allow abandonment. 162 This decision appears surprisingly
far removed from both the Midlantic Court's rule and purpose, but a closer
look reveals otherwise. The Oklahoma Refining trustee confronted a di-
lemma. He faced liquidation of an estate whose secured debts alone far ex-
ceeded the value of its assets. 163 In addition, the estate property contained
hazardous substances whose estimated cleanup cost was astronomical' 64 rel-
ative to the value of the unpolluted property. The court determined that the
Midlantic rule barred the trustee from abandoning the property without
complying with state environmental regulations. 165 Thus the trustee was
unable either to perform his administrative duties under the Code or to re-
claim the property.
The Oklahoma Refining court determined that Midlantic did not intend to
saddle bankruptcy trustees with such a dilemma.166 Instead, the court found
that Midlantic merely placed an obligation on the bankruptcy court to con-
sider state environmental laws in deciding whether to permit abandon-
ment. 167 The court further buttressed its position by factually distinguishing
the two cases. 168 In short, the Midlantic trustee, in contrast to the
Oklahoma Refining trustee, acted irresponsibly with regard to the contami-
158. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
159. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 515.
160. See infra notes 161-215 and accompanying text.
161. 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
162. Id. at 565.
163. The bankrupt estate had secured claims against it in the amount of $40 million and
unsecured claims totaling approximately $8 million. It had no unencumbered assets and no
funds that were not cash collateral. The assets of the estate were valued at approximately $4
million.
164. Uncontaminated, the property had an approximate value of $100,000. Initial cleanup
costs, however, were estimated at $2.5 million, not including thirty years of future monitoring
and cleanup expenses.
165. Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986).





nated property. 169 Moreover, the site was located in New York City. The
Oklahoma Refining property, however, was situated in rural Oklahoma, and
the trustee had done what the court considered "reasonable" in light of the
circumstances. 170 Furthermore, the Oklahoma Refining property presented
no "immediate and menacing" 17 1 threat of harm to the public. 172
The Oklahoma Refining court also noted that Midlantic addressed neither
how a trustee would fund cleanup costs' 7 3 nor a final disposition of prop-
erty.174 Thus, a demand of strict compliance with Oklahoma environmental
laws could cause the bankruptcy to continue interminably in an unresolved
state.' 75 In addition, while not unreasonable, the Oklahoma environmental
laws conflicted with the policy underlying the Code requiring efficient and
timely administration of bankrupt estates. 176 The Court thus held that al-
lowing state law to preempt the Code in this situation would impair adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy estate.177 Finally, the court decided that allowing
or denying abandonment would produce the same result, since the estate
lacked unencumbered funds to finance remediation. 178
The In re Franklin Signal Corp. 179 court held that a trustee is precluded
from abandoning a hazardous waste site only if the property poses an immi-
169. The bankruptcy court did not require the Midlantic trustee to take any action to pro-
tect the public prior to abandonment, despite the property's condition: security fencing was
not in place, deteriorating tanks were not scaled, and potentially explosive materials remained
on the property. In addition, the trustee, after abandonment, released the 24-hour security
service at the site and turned off the fire-suppression system. Moreover, the property was in
violation of a consent order at the time of abandonment. The City of New York eventually
had to decontaminate most of the property because of potential danger to the public.
Remediation cost the city approximately $2.5 million. See Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 498, 499
n.3 (1986).
170. The trustee had paid for an environmental investigation and report on the property,
arranged to remove above-ground waste and clean up storage tanks and had worked coopera-
tively with state health and environmental agencies. He had also attempted, unsuccessfully, to
sell the property.
171. One commentator has taken exception to the court's use of "immediate and menac-
ing" as synonymous with "imminent." He contends that the variance in meaning between
these terms is such that use of the former stripped the latter of some of its import and thus
shifted the Midlantic Court's emphasis. See Casenote, Bankruptcy Law, Environmental Law:
Abandonment of Hazardous Waste Sites in Bankruptcy--In re Oklahoma Refining Company,
63 Bankr. 562 (W.D. Okla 1986), 13 U. DAYTON L. REv. 511, 517-19 (1988). This author
finds the above argument weak and unpersuasive.
172. Oklahoma Ref, 63 Bankr. at 564. All the expert witnesses called to testify said the
property posed no "immediate and menacing" threat of public harm. A toxicologist did state,
however, that he believed something "bad" would happen to fresh water supplies, although he
could not ascertain when. Id. at 563-64.
173. Id. at 565.
174. Id. (citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. 474, 498 n.2 (1986)).
175. Id. at 565.
176. Id. at 566.
177. Id. at 565-66. "To pre-empt the administration of this estate would derogate the spirit
and purpose of the bankruptcy laws requiring prompt and effectual administration within a
limited time period." Id. (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966)).
178. Id. at 565. In other words, whether the property was abandoned or not, someone
other than the estate would have to fund cleanup. Clearly, if the estate included unencum-
bered assets, this statement would be untrue.
179. 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
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nent danger to the public safety. 18 In this chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee
employed a third party to investigate and report on the contents of fourteen
drums of waste. The report indicated that the drums contained at least one
chemical considered hazardous under Wisconsin law. Although Wisconsin
authorities knew of the situation, they took no action to hold anyone respon-
sible for the waste. From this lack of state action, the Franklin Signal court
inferred that the drums posed no imminent threat to the public.' 8 '
As in Oklahoma Refining, the estate in this case lacked sufficient unen-
cumbered assets to remove the hazardous waste.' 8 2 Confronted with this
predicament, the court analyzed the underpinnings of the Midlantic decision
and found that a literal interpretation of Midlantic's ruling prevented a
trustee from abandoning property if such action violated state environmental
laws.' 83 The court remained unconvinced, however, that the majority in
Midlantic intended to produce such an "undesirable" result.' 84
Instead, the bankruptcy court deduced that Midlantic intended merely to
impose, as a prerequisite to abandonment, the requirement that the trustee
first formulate conditions which adequately protected the public. 185 These
conditions are determined on a case-by-case basis.186 The bankruptcy court
must consider at least five factors: (1) the imminence of danger to the public
health and safety; (2) the extent of probable harm; (3) the amount and type
of hazardous waste; (4) the expense involved in bringing the property into
compliance with environmental laws; and (5) the amount and type of re-
sources available for cleanup.' 8 7 Consideration of these five factors, the
court concluded, effectively balanced the competing interests of the public
and the administration of the bankrupt estate.' 88 Applying this analysis, the
court held that a trustee who has taken sufficient precautionary measures to
ensure that no imminent danger will result to the public can abandon con-
180. Id. at 271-72.
18 1. Id. at 269 n. 1. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources had been apprised of
the hazardous waste in the drums. However, it expended no efforts to ensure their removal.
The court inferred from the state's inaction that the drums presented no immediate public
threat. Id. See also Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Bus. Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.) 856
F.2d 12, 16 (4th Cir. 1988) (state environmental agency inactivity implies lack of public threat)
(citing In re Purce, Inc., 76 Bankr. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987)).
182. The unencumbered assets of the estate totalled approximately $10,000. Projected cost
to remove the toxic waste was $20,000. In addition, the estate had incurred at least $17,652 in
administrative expenses.
183. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 271.
184. Id.
185. Id. According to the court, this view of Midlantic is in line with the Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 283 (1985) (debtor's duty to comply with
state court-ordered hazardous waste cleanup is dischargeable in bankruptcy). The Kovacs
court also stated that "[i]f the property is worth less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would
likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with state environmental law
to the extent of his or its ability." Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284-85 n.12.
186. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 272.
187. Id. The preabandonment conditions the Franklin Signal court imposed required the
trustee to (1) conduct an investigation to determine what, if any, hazardous substances were
present on the property; and (2) inform state and federal agencies of any contamination and of
the trustees intent to abandon. Id. at 273.




In addition, the Franklin Signal court contended that a strict application
of Midlantic to an estate that lacked sufficient funds to pay for cleanup
would lead to abandonment by default under the Code. 190 To the court, the
critical issue when the estate lacked funds to clean up property was not pub-
lic safety but who must bear cleanup costs. 191 Perhaps the state authorities'
inaction led the court to conclude that the estate's hazardous substances
posed no great danger to the public.192 The court held unwarranted a literal
reading of Midlantic because such a reading only evades the cleanup funding
problem. 193
The decision in Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-
Douglass, Inc.)194 echoes both Oklahoma Refining195 and Franklin Sig-
nal.1 96 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a trustee can uncon-
ditionally abandon contaminated property that does not greatly threaten the
public health and safety if the estate lacks unencumbered assets with which
to fund cleanup.' 97 In this chapter 11 case, the former property owners' 98
and the State of Illinois opposed abandonment. Conditions at the site unde-
niably violated several state environmental laws.' 99 Although the state had
monitored the site, it had failed to take action against the prepetition prop-
erty owner for these violations. After the bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy
court determined that the property, despite contamination, did not present
an imminent and identifiable harm to the public. 2° ° The appeals court de-
clined to disturb this decision. 20 1
The court of appeals found that the narrow exception created in Midlantic
stemmed from the Supreme Court's concern for the environment and the
189. Id. Midlantic "requires something more than mere consideration of state law, but
something less than complete compliance." Id. at 272 n.4.
190. Id. at 272 n. 5. The court raised the problem of funding CERCLA response costs
from a chapter 7 no-asset estate and then proceeded:
The ironic quirk in a strict application of Midlantic is that the property would
ultimately be abandoned by default pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(c). That sec-
tion provides: "any property scheduled under section 521(a)(1) of this title not
otherwise administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the
debtor and administered for the purpose of section 350 of the title."
Id.
191. Id. at 274 n.9. The court apparently believed Midlantic was principally concerned
with public safety.
192. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
193. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 272 n.5.
194. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
195. 63 Bankr. 562, 565-66 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
196. Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 272.
197. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 17.
198. The former owners faced the possibility of incurring liability for cleanup expenses and
were therefore interested parties to the suit.
199. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 14.
200. Id. at 16. The bankruptcy court must determine, with reference to state law, the
nature of this risk. Moreover, not all seeming violations of laws intended to protect the public
from imminent harm prevent abandonment. "Speculative and indeterminate future viola-
tions," for instance, do not. Id. (citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986)).
201. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 16.
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public safety, not the state treasury. 20 2 Consequently, if a trustee wishes to
abandon contaminated property that presents an imminent and identifiable
harm to the public, he cannot do so without first ensuring adequate protec-
tion for the public. 20 3 Midlantic does not apply if the risk to the public
health is speculative 204 or "await[ing] appropriate action by an environmen-
tal agency. '205 As in Midlantic, the Smith-Douglass court failed to decide
who ultimately must fund cleanup. 2°6 The court acknowledged, however,
that allowing abandonment increases the states' probability of paying at least
some of the cost. 20 7
The 1988 case of In re Brio Refining, Inc.20 8 provides a look at the aban-
donment issue from different angle. In this case, the trustee applied for and
obtained permission to abandon certain estate property. Over a year later,
the EPA sought to add the abandoned property to its National Priorities
List.20 9 Numerous parties potentially liable to the EPA by virtue of the
abandonment moved to have the bankruptcy estate pay for investigatory,
disposal, and cleanup expenses relating to the property. The bankruptcy
court denied their motion, reasoning that the property was not part of the
estate when the movants incurred the expenses for which they sought reim-
bursement.210 The movants then appealed to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, which affirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision. 211
The district court distinguished Brio Refining from Midlantic because, in
the former, there was no evidence of contamination prior to abandon-
ment.212 The court therefore held that Midlantic does not apply when haz-
ardous waste contamination is discovered after abandonment and when the
abandonment does not violate any environmental laws at the time of aban-
donment.21 3 In addition, the court relied upon the finality of abandoning
estate property in rejecting the movants' request.214 For this reason, the
Brio Refining estate was not liable for any expenses related to discovery or
202. Id. (citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506).
203. Id. at 16.
204. Id. (citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 15 n.4.
207. Id.
208. 86 Bankr. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
209. This list prioritizes existing and threatened releases of toxic substances into the
environment.
210. Brio Refining, 86 Bankr. at 488-89.
211. Id. at 489-90.
212. Id. at 489.
213. Id. at 489. The abandonment did not violate environmental laws because identified
contamination was not in evidence when it took place. The Midlantic exception does not
preclude abandonment which may potentially result in a future violation of environmental
laws. See Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986).
214. Brio Refining, 86 Bankr. at 490. Abandonment is generally final and irrevocable, ex-
cept in a few, limited instances. Id. See In re Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Va.
1967). The court also acknowledged that Midlantic created another restriction on abandon-
ment, but only when the property is known to be contaminated prior to abandonment, Brio
Refining, 86 Bankr. at 490 n.3, since abandonment is generally final and irrevocable, except in
a few, limited instances.
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remediation of toxic contamination. 21 5
b. Dismissal
Many other courts have interpreted Midlantic as absolutely barring aban-
donment of contaminated property that threatens the public safety unless
the trustee first brings the property into total compliance with state environ-
mental laws.2 16 At least two of these courts dismissed the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding rather than requiring the trustee to cleanup the property.2 17 Shortly
after the Midlantic decision in 1986, the trustee in In re Commercial Oil
Service, Inc. 21 8 moved to dismiss the bankruptcy pursuant to section 305219
of the Code.220 The bankruptcy court determined that dismissal would not
be in the best interest of the debtor 22 1 and declined to dismiss the case under
section 305.222 The court granted dismissal for cause pursuant to Code sec-
tion 707(a), 223 however, because of the environmental threat to the public
and the trustee's lack of experience in toxic cleanup operations.
224
In Commercial Oil, the court interpreted Midlantic as imposing on the
215. Id. at 490.
216. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213, 218-19 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943, 946-47, 947 n. 1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987); In re Stevens,
68 Bankr. 774, 780-81 (D. Me. 1987), rev'gln re Stevens, 53 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985);
In re Commercial Oil Serv., Inc., 58 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd, 88 Bankr.
126, (D.N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 64 Bankr. 900, 908 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986) (dictum).
217. 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. at 222; Commercial Oil Serv., Inc., 58 Bankr. at 318.
218. Commercial Oil Serv., Inc., 58 Bankr. at 311.
219. Section 305(a)(1) provides:
(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case under this title...
at any time if -
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dis-
missal ....
11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (1988). 11 U.S.C. § 305(c) further provides that a dismissal order is
"not reviewable by appeal or otherwise."
220. The State of Ohio supported the trustee's motion, citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 305 and 707(a)
(1988).
221. Commercial Oil Sery., 58 Bankr. at 315.
222. Id.
223. Section 707(a) provides:
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a
hearing and only for cause including -
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28;
and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within 15 days or such addi-
tional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing
such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only on
a motion by the United States trustee.
11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1988).
224. Commercial Oil Serv., 58 Bankr. at 318. Although § 707(a) only gives two instances
in which dismissal for cause is proper, the court found from its legislative history that Con-
gress intended these situations merely to be "illustrative" and not "exhaustive." Id. at 315. In
the factually similar pre-Midlantic case of In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30
Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983), the bankruptcy court also dismissed a chapter 7 proceed-
ing for cause pursuant to § 707, stating that "it was impossible for any trustee to manage the
Debtor's site in compliance with State law and thus meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 959(b)." Id. at 923.
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trustee an affirmative duty to bring the contaminated site into compliance
with state environmental laws. 225 Consequently, the trustee would have
been liable both for failure to clean up the hazardous waste site and for any
resultant injuries. 226 The court deemed this liability too great a burden to
place on a trustee inexperienced in waste disposal227 and ordered dismissal
of the bankruptcy case. 228 Noting that any distribution to creditors would
have been negligible following cleanup with estate funds, the court called
administration of the estate "an exercise in futility. '
229
More recently, in In re 82 Milbar Boulevard, Inc.230 the trustee moved to
dismiss a chapter 7 proceeding or to approve abandonment of estate prop-
erty. The court interpreted this motion as notice of the trustee's resigna-
tion23 ' and permitted the trustee to resign232 and appoint a successor
trustee.233 Based on Midlantic, the court declined to consider abandonment
as an alternative. 234
The court expressed considerable concern over trustee liability in environ-
mental bankruptcy cases. 2 35 For this reason, the court conveyed a posses-
sory interest in the contaminated property to the EPA236 pursuant to Code
section 725.237 This action insulated the trustee from as much liability as
225. Commercial Oil Serv., 58 Bankr. at 317.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 318. The court indicated it would not have dismissed the bankruptcy, however,
had federal and state environmental authorities been unwilling to take action as soon as the
property was free from protection under the Code. Id. at 316.
229. Id. at 318.
230. 91 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
231. Id. at 214.
232.
[T]he scope of a trustee's duties under the Bankruptcy Code is inconsistent with
the potential liability of a bankruptcy trustee under CERCLA and state and
local legislation. Therefore, the presence of assets within an estate which pres-
ent an unreasonable risk of liability to the trustee pursuant to environmental
legislation may constitute acceptable cause for resignation of a trustee.
Id. at 222.
233. Id. at 214. The court directed the trustee to appoint a successor under 11 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1988).
234. Id. at 219. The court found that Midlan tic prohibited it from issuing an abandonment
order because the estate lacked funds, and the trustee expertise, with which to comply with
environmental laws. Thus, practical constraints disabled the court from providing for the pub-
lic "health, safety and welfare." Id.
235. Id. at 218. The court observed that Midlantic imposed a duty on the trustee "in-
dependent of the estate's ability to fund his performance of that duty." Id. Placing such
liability on trustees could undermine the bankruptcy system and discourage competent profes-
sionals from serving as trustees. Id. at 218-19. See supra note 232.
236. The court distinguished In re Commercial Oil Serv., 58 Bankr. 311 (Bankr. D. Ohio
1986). In Commercial Oil environmental authorities assured the court they were ready to
institute cleanup action as soon as the property was free from the automatic stay. Id. at 316.
In the instant case, environmental authorities had given no such assurance. In re Milbar, 913
Bankr. at 219 n.27. See supra note 228.
237. Id. at 219. 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1988) provides:
After commencement of a case under this chapter, but before final distribution
of property of the estate under section 726 of this title, the trustee, after notice
and a hearing, shall dispose of any property in which an entity other than the
estate has an interest, such as a lien, and that has not been disposed of under
another section of this title.
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possible. Further, the conveyance permitted the EPA to exercise its respon-
sibilities under CERCLA, allowing creditors to monitor cleanup expenses,
and ensuring that the property would be sold at an optimum price.238 The
conveyance was conditioned, however, on the appointment of a successor
trustee.239 If no interim or successor trustee was in place within thirty days
of the court's order, the court noted that such absence of the substitute
trustee would be grounds for dismissal for cause under section 707(a).240
B. Giving Cleanup Costs Administrative Priority
Courts and commentators alike recognize that the real issue in toxic waste
abandonment situations is not dispensing with the property, but who will
pay for cleanup.241 Since the Midlantic Court declined to address the ques-
tion of who bore liability for cleanup expenses,242 subsequent courts have
arrived at varying results. Rights to estate assets generally arise before, and
therefore outside, bankruptcy. 243 For this reason, state law, such as Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), primarily determines the prior-
ity various secured claims will receive,244 while unsecured creditor claim
priority is set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 507.245 In general, the
trustee distributes assets first to secured creditors, second to cover adminis-
trative costs, next to unsecured creditors, and finally to shareholders.
246
The legislative history for § 725 infers that the term "interest" is limited to an ownership or
security interest. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382-83 (1977); S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1978); both reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5882, 6338. Too narrow an interpretation, however, goes against the purpose of § 725,
which is to afford the disposition of property not already abandoned, sold, or foreclosed upon
by lender. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd., 91 Bankr. at 220 n.29.
238. Id. at 220. Exactly what compliance with environmental cleanup requires, both in
terms of dollars spent and actions taken, is open to dispute. See Comment, Superfund and the
National Contingency Plan: How Dirty is "Dirty"? How Clean is "Clean"?, 12 EcOLOGY L. Q.
89, 130-46 (1984) (discussing each of adequate EPA standards for determining what consti-
tutes remediation of contaminated property).
239. Id. at 220 (property cannot be conveyed without trustee).
240. Id. at 214. A polluted asset coupled with the "reasonable unwillingness" of a trustee
to serve is cause for dismissal. Id. at 221. See also In re Mattiace Indus., Inc., 76 Bankr. 44,
47-48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying motion to convert chapter 11 proceeding to chapter 7
and dismissing under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) due to potentially unlimited trustee liability). For
other cases dismissing for cause within the context of a trustee's inability to comply with envi-
ronmental laws, see In re 30 Hill Top Street Corp., 42 Bankr. 517, 521 (D. Mass. 1984) (inabil-
ity to administer bankruptcy due to lack of money and potential harm to public); In re Charles
George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918, 923-24 (D. Mass. 1983) (impossible for
trustee to comply with state environmental laws because of cleanup expense and ongoing
threat to public safety).
241. See In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 274 n.9 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re
Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 565 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986); Developments in The Law,
supra note 53, at 1594.
242. Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 498 n.2 (1986).
243. Developments in The Law, supra note 53, at 1594.
244. See Developments in The Law, supra note 53, at 1594; Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy?
Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV.
199, 211 (1985); Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1199, 1205, 1208-10 (1984). See also Note, supra note 47, at 1046-49 (Article 9, adopted in all
states except Louisiana, establishes secured creditor rights in those states).
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988).
246. Developments in The Law, supra note 53, at 1594.
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1. Courts Favoring Administrative Priority
Developing a reliable test based on post-Midlantic decisions is nearly im-
possible for determining whether cleanup expenses merit administrative pri-
ority.247 Bankruptcy Code section 503 requires that administrative costs be
"actual, necessary costs.., of preserving the estate. '24 Each court, how-
ever, employs a slightly different standard in deciding when removal or
remediation costs meet this criteria.249
The court in Juniper Development Group v. Kahn (In re Hemingway
Transport, Inc.)250 held that both past and future CERCLA response costs
should be given administrative priority when (1) they are incurred by a pur-
chaser who was unaware of the hazardous waste at the time he purchased
the property; and (2) environmental authorities have notified the debtor of
the waste and ordered clean up but the debtor has failed to comply. 251 Juni-
per Development Group (Juniper) purchased property from the debtor,
Hemingway Transport, Inc. (Hemingway) through its trustee.252 Before the
sale, state environmental authorities advised Hemingway of hazards linked
to chemicals contained in drums located on the subject property and ordered
their removal. 253 Hemingway failed to comply with the order. When the
property was sold, neither Juniper, the trustee, nor the courts approving the
sale were aware of the hazardous substances.
The court noted that, while the hazardous waste was on the property prior
to bankruptcy, Juniper's liability actually arose postpetition 254 because it did
not own the property until then. The court assumed that the debtor at-
tempted to pass off its liability for cleanup 25 5 and therefore refused to allow
this escape. 256 Indeed, prior decisions showed that courts frown on a
debtor's efforts to transfer liability under state or federal environmental
laws.257 For this reason, the court held that any of Juniper's claims for re-
sponse costs under CERCLA should be given administrative priority in
Hemingway's bankruptcy. 258
In another case, In re Pierce Coal and Construction, Inc.,259 the court held
that land reclamation expenses are entitled to administrative priority under
247. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
248. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) grants administrative priority to "the actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case." (emphasis added).
249. See infra notes 254-65, 272-77, 279, 283-90, 306-10 and accompanying text.
250. 73 Bankr. 494 (D. Mass. 1987).
251. Id. at 505.
252. Hemingway originally filed a chapter 11 petition for reorganization. The chapter 11
proceeding was eventually converted to chapter 7. The Hemingway-Jupiter transaction, how-
ever, took place prior to the chapter 7 conversion.
253. 73 Bankr. at 501. See also Juniper Dev. Corp. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transport,
Inc.), 105 Bankr. 171, 173 (D. Mass. 1989) (state officials informed Hemingway of toxants and
ordered cleanup before Hemingway filed bankruptcy.)
254. Id. at 503.
255. Id. at 505.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 505.
258. Id.
259. 65 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1986).
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section 503 when incurred postpetition by a debtor-in-possession in operat-
ing the estate.26° Debtor-generated prepetition expenses, however, are
not. 261 The court reasoned that Congress determined which expenses de-
serve administrative priority, and environmental cleanup costs are not
among them.262 Moreover, the bankruptcy court generally lacks authority
to elevate a prepetition unsecured claim to administrative priority. 26 3 The
Pierce Coal court believed that Midlantic created the only exception to this
rule.264 Midlantic recognized administrative priority for cleanup costs only
when environmental hazards pose an imminent and identifiable harm to the
public safety.265
2. Courts Denying Administrative Priority
In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant &
Russell) 266 Burlington Northern Railroad (BN), as lessor, was jointly liable
under CERCLA267 for expenses involved in cleaning up hazardous wastes
the lessee/debtor-in-possession had deposited on BN property.268 BN as-
serted that postpetition expenditures to mitigate toxic waste hazards, which
arose from the debtor-in-possession's breach of postpetition leases, deserved
administrative priority.269  BN cited Midlantic as controlling.270  The
debtor-in-possession countered that both BN's claim for reimbursement and
its prospective claim for additional cleanup costs arose out of prepetition
activities and were therefore general, unsecured claims. The Dant & Russell
court declined to follow Midlantic and, instead, looked to the Supreme
Court's decision in Ohio v. Kovacs,271 in which the Court characterized simi-
260. Id. at 530.
261. Id.
262. Id. (although Congress expanded priorities for § 507 prepetition expenses in 1984, it
made no provision for environmental damages).
263. Id. at 531.
264. Id.
265. Id. The Pierce Coal court indicated that compelling circumstances, such as imminent
public harm, might even warrant elevation of cleanup costs to secured priority. Id. See also In
re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987) (state claim for reimbursement for postpetition
cleanup of toxic waste that occurred prepetition qualified as administrative expense because
improper storage of hazardous waste exposes public to immediate and identifiable danger); In
re Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R., 756 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1985) (dictum) (expenses
incurred to "avert imminent danger" can be given administrative priority because creditors
benefit when estate avoids tort liability).
266. 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
267. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9607(a)(2) (1988).
268. 853 F.2d at 702. The debtor owned most of the land in question, but BN also owned
and leased a portion of it to the debtor.
269. Oregon environmental authorities did not identify the property as a hazardous waste
site until after the debtor filed bankruptcy. When the debtor-in-possession failed to comply
with the Oregon authorities, BN spent over $250,000 in an attempt to minimize harm to the
public. Cleanup costs were estimated to be between $10 and $30 million. The debtor-in-pos-
session's unencumbered assets totalled approximately $3 million.
270. Apparently, BN relied on the Supreme Court's ruling that a trustee cannot abandon
property in contravention of state laws intended to protect public health and safety. See
Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986).
271. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
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lar cleanup expenses as an unsecured claim.272
The court indicated that the fact that BN, and not the debtor-in-posses-
sion, owned the property in question was a primary factor in influencing its
decision. 273 Presumably, if the estate had owned the property, the court
would have given BN's claim administrative priority.274 Because the Bank-
ruptcy Code treats the breach of an ongoing lease as a prepetition event,
275
however, the court also characterized the damages arising from such breach
as prepetition and refused to give them administrative priority. 276 If BN had
not owned the property, the Dant & Russel court would have treated all
expenditures of funds to preserve estate-owned property as administrative
expenses, whether or not related to prepetition waste.277
In contrast, the In re Brio Refining, Inc. 278 court ruled that environmental
investigation and cleanup expenses did not warrant administrative priority
when incurred after abandonment of the property. 279 This holding indicates
that a bankrupt estate is not liable for the costs of environmental cleanup
occurring after property is no longer a part of the estate. Brio Refining is
distinguishable from the other cases, however, because awareness of possible
contamination did not arise until after abandonment. The court therefore
did not have to address whether CERCLA liability passed with the property
or remained with the estate. In addition, the Brio Refining court failed to
reach the question whether the previously abandoned property violated envi-
ronmental laws when the potentially responsible parties applied for adminis-
trative expense status.280
272. Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 708. In Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 282-83, the court
ruled that an injunction requiring cleanup of contaminated property was merely a general,
unsecured claim. The Dant & Russell court also found persuasive the reasoning of the third
circuit in Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (state admin-
istrative order requiring drainage ditch cleanup a mere unsecured claim).
273. Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 709.
274. Id. The court noted that both Kovacs and Southern Ry. also involved lessors seeking,
unsuccessfully, administrative expense priority for cleanup costs on property the respective
estates did not own. The court then stated, "quite a different result, however, is warranted
when cleanup costs result from monies expended for the preservation of the bankruptcy es-
tate." Id.
275. Id. at 709. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
276. Dant & Russell, 853 F.2d at 709.
277. Id. The court based its conclusion on the following cases: Lancaster v. Tennessee (In
re Wall Tube & Metal Prods. Co.), 831 F.2d 118, 124 (6th Cir. 1987) (state's CERCLA re-
sponse costs from debtor's estate given administrative priority); Cramer v. Mammoth Mart,
Inc. (In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976) (claims of third parties
who supplied goods and services to debtor-in-possession which benefitted estate given adminis-
trative priority); In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (D. Me. 1987) (state claim for property
cleanup costs granted administrative status); In re Distrigas Corp., 66 Bankr. 382, 386 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1986) (state entitled to administrative priority for expenses in cleaning up debtor's
otherwise worthless property); In re Vermont Real Estate Inv. Trust, 25 Bankr. 804, 806
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1982) (claim for work which city required and performed to preserve estate
entitled to administrative priority); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.N.J.
1983) (claims for future expenses not awarded administrative priority).
278. 86 Bankr. 487 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
279. Id. at 488-90 (potentially responsible parties did not incur "actual, necessary costs and
expenses of preserving the estate").
280. Id. at 490.
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More recently, In re Microfab, Inc. 281 presented another situation in
which a court refused to give cleanup expenses administrative priority. Mas-
sachusetts authorities sought an order requiring the trustee to clean up at the
estate's expense, estate property contaminated by hazardous waste or to pay
the State of Massachusetts to do the same. 282 The court denied the request
because the state failed to show that expenditure of all the estate's funds
would significantly reduce the threat to public safety. 283 Moreover, the
court found premature the state's request for administrative priority when it
had not yet expended funds. 28 4 Any ruling as to administrative priority
would be merely speculative because, up to that point, the state had not
incurred any expense for cleanup.285
The court also considered whether 28 U.S.C. section 959(b)286 or Midlan-
tic requires a liquidation trustee to remediate site contamination. The court
held that, under Midlantic, a chapter 7 trustee must ensure that contami-
nated property complies with state environmental laws.287 Funds expended
to accomplish this are administrative expenses of the estate. 288 The court
limited Midlantic's effect, however, holding that the trustee is not required to
undertake cleanup if the estate lacks funds to produce "appreciable" re-
sults. 289 Moreover, since the state's actual cleanup expenses were undeter-
mined, the court could not know whether the estate would be able to pay
them.29o
The court further held that section 959(b) does not require a chapter 7
trustee to clean up contaminated property because the trustee does not man-
age or operate it.291 Instead, he merely oversees liquidation of the estate and
distribution of assets. 292 In addition, the court found that environmental
cleanup obligations should be treated as general, unsecured claims of the
estate, not as personal responsibilities of the trustee.293
Finally, the Microfab court ruled that Midlantic obligates a trustee to
maintain estate property in complete compliance with state environmental
laws on an administrative expense basis, even when he does not seek to aban-
281. 105 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
282. Id. at 162.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 162, 166.
285. Id.
286. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1988) requires a trustee to manage and operate property in ac-
cordance with valid state laws.
287. 105 Bankr. at 166.
288. Id.
289. Id. The party seeking the trustee's cleanup efforts must prove both that he has the
assets to achieve the results and that such expenses would have an appreciable effect on the
property. Moreover, "[n]o court in equity can require a Trustee simply to throw money away,
even in the name of a worthy cause." Id. at 169.
290. Id. at 166.
291. Id. at 168.
292. Id. See Walker v. Maury County (In re Scott Housing Systems, Inc.), 91 Bankr. 190,
195-96 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988).
293. 105 Bankr. at 167 ("As a general rule, an environmental cleanup obligation should be
treated as a claim, not as a specific performance obligation that the Trustee must carry out on
an administrative expense basis").
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don the property.294 Several exceptions limit this broad obligation:295 (1)
the environmental laws must be intended to protect the public from "immi-
nent and identifiable harm; ' 2 9 6 (2) the violation caused by abandonment or
failure to remove toxic wastes must be certain;29 7 (3) the environmental laws
cannot be so onerous as to interfere with settling the bankrupt estate; 298 and
(4) the trustee must have the funds or other financial resources necessary to
facilitate cleanup.299 The court deemed the state's failure to put on sufficient
evidence to establish the last two conditions as further reason to deny its
administrative expense request. 3° °
3. In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc.
In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc. 301 sheds some light on the cleanup expense
claim priority issue. The Better-Brite court ruled that a trustee is obligated
to bring contaminated property into compliance with state environmental
laws on an administrative expense basis. 30 2 This obligation, however, de-
pends on the availability of unencumbered assets with which to pay cleanup
costs. 30 3 If the estate lacks unencumbered assets and the property poses no
imminent danger to the public, the trustee may abandon the property. 3° 4
In this case the EPA and Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) were in the process of investigating and remediating toxic contami-
nation on three estate properties. 30 5 They argued that pursuant to Code sec-
tion 506(C) 3 0 6 expenses they had incurred in investigating and remediating
the property entitled them to future sale proceeds from these properties,
ahead of the bank as the secured creditor.30 7 The court agreed and held that
294. Id. at 168, 169.
295. Id. at 169.
296. Id. (citing Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494, 507 (1986); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr.
943, 947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987)).
297. Id. (citing Midlantic, 494 U.S. at 407; Peerless, 70 Bankr. at 947).
298. Id. (citing In re Wall Tube & Metal Co., 831 F.2d 118, 122 n.13 (6th Cir. 1987) and
Peerless, 70 Bankr. at 947).
299. Id. (citing In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988)); In re National
Smelting of New Jersey, Inc., 49 Bankr. 1012, 1014-15 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985)).
300. Id. at 169.
301. 105 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989).
302. Id. at 917.
303. Id.
304. Id. See also In re FCX, Inc., 96 Bankr. 49, 54-55 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (crucial
determination in authorizing abandonment is whether subject property poses immediate threat
to public); In re Purco, 76 Bankr. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (abandonment allowable
when "conditions are such that abandonment will not render the public health and safety
inadequately protected").
305. The DNR filed state court actions against the debtor both before and after the chapter
11 bankruptcy filing, seeking forfeitures and cease and desist orders. Cease and desist orders
were issued several months after commencement of the bankruptcy. Contempt proceedings
followed these orders. The EPA, however, did not initiate any of its actions until after the
debtor sought protection under the Bankruptcy Code. Better-Brite Plating, 105 Bankr. at 915.
306. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988) provides: "The trustee may recover from property securing
an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or dispos-
ing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim."




the EPA and DNR, in remediating the property, stood in the trustee's shoes
and preserved the estate for the benefit of the bank.30 8 The court further
held that because the bank did not intend to foreclose on the property, its
security interest in the property should be treated as an unsecured claim. 3° 9
For this reason, the EPA and the DNR were entitled to recover their ex-
penses from the property sale proceeds ahead of the secured creditors.310
4. Automatic Stay
Environmental cleanup orders are exempt from the protective automatic
stay3 1 and, therefore, preempt even secured creditors.31 2 Orders to expend
money for cleanup, however, are not exempt. 313 Unfortunately, the differ-
ence between the two orders remains unclear. 31 4
Because this Comment deals with potential, rather than actual, toxic
waste contamination, it does not dwell on the automatic stay. If toxic waste
is merely suspected, or if an EPA ruling is only pending, exemption from the
automatic stay is irrelevant. Only when the EPA has issued a definitive
statement identifying contamination does the automatic stay come into play.
IV. OPTIONS AVAILABLE To THE LENDER
The lender is in an unenviable position when burdened with a bankrupt
debtor whose trustee wants to abandon potentially hazardous property on
which the EPA has yet to make a ruling. Several options, however, are
available to the lender in this situation. First, the lender can object to the
abandonment. 31 5 If the court approves abandonment, the lender must
choose between foreclosing the property, and possibly incurring CERCLA
liability,316 or releasing its collateral altogether. 317
The lender may also seek to avoid cleanup costs by asserting that aban-
donment will not relieve the estate of its CERCLA liability. 318 Alterna-
tively, the lender may request that its claim for cleanup expenses receive
308. 105 Bankr. at 918.
309. Id. (pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988)).
310. Id. See also In re Mowbray Engineering Co., Inc., 67 Bankr. 34, 35 (Bankr. M.D. Al.
1986) (upon property sale, EPA can recover same remediation costs trustee would, but for
abandonment). Future courts will probably follow the Better-Brite ruling on grounds of fair-
ness. They are likely to reason that, if the EPA or other environmental entities remediate the
property to the secured creditors' benefit, fairness dictates reimbursing them for their trouble
at the secured creditors' expense. Such a rule effectively side-steps the problem raised by Con-
gress' failure to prioritize environmental cleanup claims. Unfortunately, the rule is yet another
blow for lenders.
311. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). The automatic stay forces all claimants against the estate to
hold their claims until all claims have been made, subject to a time deadline, so that the bank-
ruptcy court can equitably distribute the estate's limited assets. See Developments in The Law,
supra note 53, at 1587.
312. See Note, supra note 47, at 1046.
313. Developments in The Law, supra note 53, at 1595.
314. Id.
315. See infra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 96-97, 102-25 and accompanying text.
317. See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 3, at 870.
318. See infra notes 347-51 and accompanying text.
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administrative priority. 319 Finally, the court may decide to dismiss the
bankruptcy 320 or give environmental authorities a possessory interest in the
property. 32 1
To date, no court has ruled on this specific issue. Nonetheless, the cases
discussed so far provide insight into the lender's options. The following dis-
cussion analyzes the various effects on the lender in exercising these options.
A. Object to Abandonment
As a first course of action, the lender should file an objection to the
trustee's notice of abandonment. 322 Grounds for the objection include the
fact that the property is potentially contaminated with hazardous sub-
stances. 323 The lender should assert that the estate is potentially liable for
cleanup costs under CERCLA 324 and that allowing the trustee to abandon
the property may endanger the public health and safety. 325
In response to the trustee's objection, the court will probably apply the
same analysis used in determining whether to allow abandonment of known
polluted property. 326 The lender's evidence of property contamination is
thus critically important. 327 This evidence must be more than mere specula-
tion that the property contains hazardous substances; it must at least estab-
lish a strong inference of present contamination. 328 Facing a strong
inference of contamination, the court may require the trustee to forego aban-
donment until after the EPA has had time to make an investigation and a
ruling.
3 29
319. See infra notes 357-60 and accompanying text.
320. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
321. See infra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
322. The lender must file its objection within 15 days of the abandonment notice. BANKR.
R. 6007(a). If the lender timely objects to abandonment, the court will set the matter for
hearing. BANKR. R. 6007(c).
323. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
324. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988), property owners are liable for CERCLA re-
sponse costs. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988)
defines as an owner anyone owning or operating the property.
325. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
326. The primary objections to abandonment of contaminated property are 1) danger to
the public health and safety and 2) debtor avoidance of cleanup costs. See supra notes 55-57,
128 and accompanying text. Arguably, these same objections also apply to potentially contam-
inated property. Thus, courts will probably employ the same rules in deciding whether to
approve abandonment, regardless of whether the subject property is actually or only possibly
contaminated.
327. If drums of chemicals from a defunct oil treatment plant are located on the property,
along with pits or waste areas where toxants are known to have been dumped, the court may
delay its decision pending an EPA ruling.
328. Midlantic, 494 U.S. 494, 507 n.9 (1986); In re Brio Ref., 86 Bankr. 487, 489 (N.D.
Tex. 1986).
329. To date, no case law directly addresses this issue. However, see Midlantic, 474 U.S.
494, 507 (1986) (bankruptcy court cannot approve abandonment without first "formulating
conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and safety"); In re Franklin Signal
Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (outlining factors bankruptcy court must
consider before authorizing abandonment). For a list of these factors, see supra notes 186-187
and accompanying text. See also In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213, 217 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("If trustees.., are ... permitted to dispose of hazardous wastes under the
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In this event, the question arises regarding who should fund the investiga-
tion. Possibly, the trustee will arrange to pay for it with estate assets, as in
In re Oklahoma Refining Company.330 If the estate lacks unencumbered as-
sets, the secured creditors will, in effect, finance the investigation, since any
money spent on it will reduce the amount they would otherwise recover
from the estate.
Another factor the court will consider is whether the estate possesses
unencumbered assets sufficient to fund the environmental cleanup in whole
or in part. The less unencumbered assets an estate possesses, the more likely
a court will approve abandonment. 33' In addition, the court will likely place
a great deal of weight on the potential for harm to the public. 332 If the
property poses little present harm to the public or the threat of harm to the
public is not imminent, the court may allow abandonment. 333
The Midlantic decision speaks particularly to this point. In Midlantic the
majority hastened to point out that the limitation placed on the trustee's
abandonment powers was a narrow one. 334 The Court expressly did not
preclude abandonment in situations where the harm was merely speculative
and the danger was neither imminent nor identifiable. 335 A number of
courts since Midlantic have capitalized on the narrowness of the holding. 336
Court have authorized abandonment in situations involving unquestionably
contaminated property if the possibility for harm to the public was slight or
unknown. 337 One court determined that harm was likely to occur several
years into the future instead of at the time of the objection to abandon-
ment.338 Consequently, the court allowed abandonment on grounds that,
absent the threat of immediate public danger, the Midlantic restriction did
cloak of the abandonment power, compliance with environmental protection laws will be
transformed into governmental cleanup by default.") (quoting In re Quanta Resources Corp.,
739 F.2d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985), aff'd, 474 U.S. 494 (1986)).
330. 63 Bankr. 562, 563 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (trustee obtained secured creditor con-
sent to use cash collateral to pay for environmental report on contaminated site and to mini-
mize immediate hazards caused by contamination).
331. Borden, Inc. v. Wells-Fargo Business Credit (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 856 F.2d
12, 17 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986); In re Oklahoma Ref. Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 565 (W.D. Okla. 1986). The courts in these
cases approved abandonment of contaminated properties because the estates lacked sufficient
assets to enable the trustees to bring the properties into compliance with state environmental
laws.
332. See, e.g., Smith-Douglas, 856 F.2d at 16-17 (bankruptcy court had previously deter-
mined contaminated fertilizer plant presented no immediate threat to public safety and al-
lowed chapter 11 trustee to abandon unconditionally; the district court affirmed this
reasoning.); Franklin Signal, 65 Bankr. at 271-72 (trustee needs only take action sufficient to
ensure that abandonment won't endanger public) (noting Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284-
85 n.12 (1985)); Oklahoma Ref., 63 Bankr. at 563-64, 566 (due to lack of immediate and
menacing threat to public water supplies, chapter 7 trustee could abandon property).
333. See supra note 332.
334. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
335. Id.
336. See discussion supra notes 161-215 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 171-72, 180-81, 197-201 and accompanying text.
338. Oklahoma Ref, 63 Bankr. at 563-64, 566.
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not apply.339 Even when toxic contamination is already established, courts
continue to allow abandonment absent imminent hazard to the public; there-
fore, they should approve abandonment where the presence of hazardous
substances is merely a possibility. Even when evidence of contamination is
clear, the trustee may abandon the property before an EPA ruling, if the
court gives preeminence to the estate's financial condition and a relative lack
of potential for danger. 340
B. Foreclosure
If the court approves abandonment the trustee will, of course, abandon
the property. Following the trustee's abandonment, the lender has two op-
tions. First, the lender can leave the property alone, thus losing its opportu-
nity to recover anything from the debtor. Alternatively, the lender can
foreclose on the property, sell it to the highest bidder, and apply the net
proceeds of the sale to the indebtedness. The danger inherent in this latter
course of action, however, results from the ever present possibility that the
EPA will, subsequent to abandonment, determine that the property is con-
taminated and issue a cleanup order. In this event, the EPA, and subse-
quently a court, could also hold the lender liable as an owner or operator
and impose CERCLA response costs. 34 1
If the lender is able to sell the property to a third party during foreclosure,
it will avoid the characterization as an owner or operator.342 If the lender
purchases the property at the foreclosure sale, however, it must exercise ex-
treme caution not to step outside CERCLA's "indicia of ownership" excep-
tion.343 The lender can neither participate in the day-to-day operations of
the facility344 nor become too involved in the facility's financial affairs.3 45
Failure of a lender to meet these requirements could lead a court to
recharacterize the lender's conduct as acts of ownership or operation, giving
rise to CERCLA liability. 346
C. Failure of Abandonment to Relieve Estate of CERCLA Liability
A court could determine that a trustee's abandonment of contaminated
property does not relieve the estate of CERCLA liability. Indeed, several
339. Id. See supra note 172.
340. See supra notes 331-32.
341. See supra notes 93-119 and accompanying text.
342. See Corash & Behrendt, supra note 3, at 870 (lenders who don't take title to contami-
nated property are immune from CERCLA liability)
343. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) provides that "owner or operator . . . does not include a
person, [sic] who, without participating in the management of a... facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facility."
344. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (lender who participates in day-to-day operations of toxic waste site falls
outside "indicia of ownership" exception). But see United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D. Md. 1986) (lender can be liable as owner under CERCLA
without ever operating facility).
345. The difference between acceptable financial involvement and overreaching under
CERCLA is nearly indistinguishable. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
346. See discussion supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
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cases and commentators have adopted the position that abandoning property
does not relieve the bankrupt estate of its obligation for response costs. 347 A
striking difference between those cases and the issue at hand, however, is
that, in the former, the trustee abandoned properties known to be contami-
nated at the time of abandonment. When a trustee abandons property before
an EPA ruling that it is polluted with hazardous waste, the courts may favor
relief for the estate. In Brio Refining,348 for instance, since no party knew of
the hazardous substances until after the property was abandoned, the estate
was not held liable for cleanup costs, 349 even though the debtor presumably
caused or allowed the toxic substances to be dumped on the property before
filing bankruptcy.
Brio Refining is distinguishable, however, because none of the potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) contested the trustee's attempts to abandon the
property, even though all received notice of his intentions. Only after the
EPA put the property on its National Priority List,350 more than a year
later, did the PRPs assert (in hindsight) that the court lacked jurisdiction to
authorize the trustee to abandon the property. The PRPs argued that the
estate should therefore bear the cleanup costs. Courts should treat differ-
ently estate liability under a post-abandonment EPA ruling of preabandon-
ment contamination if the lender objected to the abandonment on toxic
waste grounds. The consideration a court gives this type of objection from
the lender depends on the strength of the lender's evidence of presently ex-
isting toxic contamination. Once again, the court may decline to hold the
estate liable if it lacks capacity to pay CERCLA response costs. 351 If a court
that embraces this view also concludes that the lender's conduct has placed
it outside the indicia of ownership exemption, the lender will be forced to
fund cleanup.
Conceivably, a ruling that the estate did not avoid CERCLA liability
through abandonment would not automatically exonerate the lender from
similar obligations. A court could hold the estate and the lender jointly and
severally liable under CERCLA: the estate, if the court concludes that
prepetition toxic waste existed on the property; 35 2 the lender, if the court
deems its postforeclosure conduct outside the indicia of ownership excep-
tion.353 No case law exists on this point. A court holding that lenders are in
the best position to monitor and prevent toxic waste contamination and to
incorporate their potential for CERCLA response costs into their loan
agreements, however, could reach such a decision. 354 In addition, the strong
public policy favoring compliance with environmental laws and against
347. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
348. In re Brio Ref., Inc., 86 Bankr. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
349. Id. at 489-90. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
350. This list prioritizes existing and threatened releases of toxic substances into the envi-
ronment. See supra note 209.
351. See discussion supra notes 161-215 of various courts' reasons for approving abandon-
ment of contaminated property.
352. See supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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pushing the burden of cleanup costs onto the government and the taxpayer
may cause a court to look to both the estate and the lender for at least partial
financing of cleanup.3 55 If the court adopts this view, the lender will proba-
bly bear the cleanup burden alone, since the estate rarely has appreciable
assets with which to fund such costs.
356
D. Seek Administrative Priority for Response Costs
If either the EPA or the court, or both, requires the lender to pay CER-
CLA response costs, either solely or jointly with the debtor, the lender can
petition the court to classify these expenses as administrative.3 57 Adminis-
trative priority allows the lender to recoup at least some of the money it
spends on cleanup. Based on existing case law, the lender has a good chance
of successfully asserting administrative status for its claim.358 A drawback
to this alternative, however, is that the cleanup bill often greatly surpasses
the value of the estate's assets. 359 Thus, the lender who pays CERCLA re-
sponse costs will probably not entirely recoup them on an administrative
expense basis. Of course, the lender can sell the property and use the pro-
ceeds to help offset this expense. Undoubtedly, though, the lender wil, in-
stead, want to apply such proceeds to the debtor's loan balance.
Consequently, if the sale price does not exceed response costs, the lender will
be unable to recover any of its security interest in the property. Unless the
lender can recover all of its response costs and at least part of the debtor's
obligation, the lender should let the property go altogether.
360
E. EPA Possessory Interest
If the lender does not sell the property between the trustee's abandonment
and an EPA cleanup order, a court may convey to the EPA a possessory
interest in the site, as the court did in 82 Milbar Blvd. 361 If the EPA obtains
a possessory interest, the lender should be able to monitor cleanup costs
362
and ensure that the decontaminated property brings the highest possible sale
price. 363 This route hardly offers a better alternative, however, than letting
the property go, because if the EPA funds cleanup, proceeds from the sale of
355. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 163, 182 and accompanying text.
357. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) grants administrative status to "the actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services
rendered after the commencement of the case" (emphasis supplied).
358. See supra notes 251-60 and accompanying text. See also supra note 277 for a list of
cases in which claims were given administrative priority.
359. See Corash and Behrendt, supra note 3, at 864 n.10 (on average, CERCLA cleanup
costs run approximately $26 million, but in some cases, they have exceeded $250 million).
360. If the lender abandoned the property initially, it would not incur CERCLA liability.
Thus, although the lender would lose its collateral, it would avoid cleanup expenses. Obvi-
ously, if the property is worth more than estimated response costs and the mortgage combined,
the lender will choose to foreclose.
361. See In re 82 Milbar Blvd., Inc., 91 Bankr. 213, 219 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
362. Id. at 220, 220 n.33.
363. Id. See supra note 238.
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the property will apply first toward EPA expenses. 36
This situation leads to a result similar to when the lender assumes respon-
sibility and funds the cleanup itself. The difference between the EPA and
the lender initially financing cleanup is that unless a court holds the lender
responsible for all cleanup costs, the EPA will have access only to the pro-
ceeds from sale of the property.365 The EPA cannot dip into the lender's
pocket for expenses exceeding the sale price. This important distinction
could enable the lender to avoid potentially staggering cleanup costs. If the
cost of cleanup exceeds the value of the property, however, the lender will be
financially no better off than if it had entirely abandoned its claims to its
collateral.
F. Dismissal
Dismissal essentially creates the same problems for lenders as abandon-
ment. Presumably, after dismissal the debtor will default on its mortgage, if
it has not previously done so. The lender will then be forced to choose be-
tween foreclosure and its attendant risk of future CERCLA liability or aban-
doning its collateral. 366
V. CONCLUSION
The lender wishing to prevent abandonment of potentially contaminated
property should timely file an objection with the bankruptcy court. The
lender must then prepare strong evidence of contamination. Mere specula-
tion about hazardous substances will not influence a court to deny
abandonment.
If the evidence strongly infers the presence of toxic waste on the property,
a court should require the trustee to use the estate's unencumbered assets to
remediate the property. The realities of forcing a trustee to fund cleanup
with negligible estate assets, however, have led courts to qualify Midlantic at
almost every turn. Thus, a court will probably approve abandonment if the
estate lacks sufficient unencumbered assets to fund cleanup or if the property
does not pose an imminent danger to the public health and safety.
If the court allows the trustee to abandon the property, the lender should
think twice before foreclosing on it. A lender may incur CERCLA liability
under a subsequent EPA cleanup order if preserving its security interest
takes the lender outside the indicia of ownership exemption. For this reason,
many lenders have adopted a hands-off policy towards abandoned toxic
waste facilities. Considering the staggering costs of cleanup, this option may
be the lesser of two evils.
The lender forced to fund cleanup costs stands a good chance of recouping
364. Possibly the court will not allow the EPA to apply all sale proceeds towards cleanup
costs. But see supra notes 301-10 and accompanying text.
365. See In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc., 105 Bankr. 912, 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989)
(EPA and state environmental authorities entitled to proceeds ahead of bank, a secured credi-
tor, because bank did not intend to foreclose on property if abandoned).
366. See discussion supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
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part of its response costs from the estate as administrative expenses. This
possibility is often of little solace to the lender, though. The lender stands to
lose financially unless it can recover all of its response costs on an adminis-
trative expense basis. Unfortunately, cleanup costs generally far exceed the
value of the unencumbered estate assets and the unpolluted property
combined.
The prudent lender should take care to determine its prospective debtors'
involvement with toxic waste contamination and incorporate its own poten-
tial for CERCLA liability into the terms of its loan agreements. Careful
lenders should also monitor hazardous waste facilities to prevent the possi-
bility of facing response costs. The lender whose toxic waste debtors are
already in bankruptcy, however, currently has little choice but to abandon
its collateral or personally face CERCLA liability.

